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IN

THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J

STATE BANK,
corporation,
Plaintiff Appellant,
vs

W. S. BRIMHALL, Commissioner of
Financial Institutions of the
State of Utah; and

Case No.
11900

BANK OF NORTHERN UTAH, an unincorporated association,
Defendants-Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This action is brought for a review of the decision and
proceedings of the defendant Commissioner of Financial In>titutions in authorizing the Bank of Northern Utah to establish
a bank in Clearfield, Utah, pursuant to the order of said
Commissioner, dated March 12, 1969.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court awarded judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, of no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant-respondents seek affirmation of the lower
court decision and the action of the Commissioner of Financial
Institutions in authorizing the Bank of Northern Utah to establish a bank in Clearfield, Utah.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The application of defendant, Bank of Northern Utah_
to establish a unit bank in Clearfield, Utah, was filed Septelllber
17, 1968 (R 50) and appellant, Clearfield State Bank, immediately filed protest. A hearing on the application was had
November 26, 1968.
At said hearing substantial evidence was presented showing a need for another bank in Clearfield. It was established that
Clearfield, a city of in excess of 10,000 people, was served bv
only one bank, the appellant herein, and that the trading
which would be served by the appellant, Clearfield State Bank.
and the respondent, Bank of Northern Utah, would include a '
population of in excess of 15,000 people. (Tr 129, 132)
Further, it was pointed out that Davis County is the
fastest growing county in the State of Utah (Tr 118) and that
the median income of families in Davis County and particularly
in Clearfield City was among the highest in the State (Ex 1, pps
67,68,69) facts which were born out by the substantial growth
experienced by the appellant, Clearfield State Bank, and other
banks in the area over the past ten years. (Ex 1, p 50)
The need for another bank in Clearfield was further
pointed up by the fact that only three counties in the State have
more population per banking facility than does the Davis County
and the Clearfield area. (Tr 13 2, Ex 1, p 4 5)
The Mayor of Clearfield City and the President of the
Clearfield Chamber of Commerce each testified that, based on
the information and knowledge acquired by them while acting
in their official capacities, another bank was necessary in the
Clearfield area. (Tr 22-23, 39-44)
Substantial evidence was presented as to the character
and fitness of the incorporators (personal information sheets,
Tr 57-60, 146, 253) and as to the projected profitability of the
proposed bank (Tr 5 7-7 3) so as to insure the protection of the
citizens in the Clearfield area.
Based on the information presented at the hearing, a
small portion of which is set out above, the Commissioner of
Financial Institutions approved the application of the Bank of
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1

1

Northern Utah by Order dated March 12, 1969 (R 6-10). Sub1cquently plaintiff-appellant prosecuted its review of that order
;.1 the District Court. The District Court after hearing oral
.,.·,:u111cnt and reviewing the complete record entered its
::ll" '>randum
decision affirming tl-e action of the Comof Financial Institutions. (R 24-34) From which demion the appellant, Clearfield State Bank has prosecuted review
to this Court.
For the purposes of this brief, the transcript of the
administrative hearing is referred to by the abbreviation, "Tr.",
and the exhibits, as marked in the hearing.

ARGUMENTS
POINT I
THE PROPOSED BANKING FACILITY DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE A BRANCH BANK SO AS TO VIOLATE UTAH
LAW.
In recent years the question of what constitutes branch
banking has been much litigated in the courts of this country.
Under the decisions of those courts treating tre question, it is
clear that the proposed bank here in question would not be
considered a branch bank.
One of the earliest cases to consider the question was
the case of Daniel vs. Best 224 Iowa 1348, 279 NW 374 (1938);
23 ALR 3d 683, there two new banks were proposed by the
stockholders of an existing bank when they voted the appropriation of part of the surplus of the latter to the organization
of the new banks. The court held that the new banks were not
branch banks in spite of the fact that the two new banks were
managed by a board of three trustees selected by the directors
of the existing bank from their own members, which three
trustees were the president, vice-president and cashier of the
existing banks. The court reasoned that where the business of
each bank was conducted independent of one another and of
the existing banks, and where each bank kept separate records
they did not constitute branch banks.
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The Colorado Supreme Court in rt:cent decisions hJi
reached results similar to that of the Iowa Court. J>eoplcs lla 11 k
vs. Banking Board, (Colo). 436 P2d 681 (1968);Goldy 1•s. Crai"
(Colo), 445 P2d 212 (1968); Nemurow l'S. 13100111, (Colo), 44r1
P2d 214 (1968).
In the )Jeoples Bank case, supra, the Supreme Court ot
Colorado affirmed the granting of an application in which the
existing Guaranty Bank and Trust Co., of Denver, through it.i
executive officers, put together the materials contained in the
application. The court noted that the stock ownership of the two ,
banks would be the same and proportionately identical; that the
board of directors and chief executive officers would be the same:
that the employees of the new bank would be trained and furn.
ished by Guaranty Trust and that all accounting for the new
bank would be done by the later. In upholding the Commission·
er's action, the court stated that in order to establish that a pro- ,
posed bank is a branch bank, the protestant must show that in
substance Guaranty Bank and Trust was doing business through
the instrumentality of the newly proposed bank or vice versa, in
the same way as if the institutions were one, and that such had
not been shown.
The Crane case, supra, followed the rationale of the
Peoples Bank Case, supra. In this case the Colorado Banking
Commission denied the charter of three proposed industrial
banks on the ground that they would constitute branch banks.
The District Court reversed the decision and the Supreme Court
affirmed such reversal. The facts of the case were, that except for
the resident office manager, each bank would have common off ,
icers and directors, that all said officers and directors were also
officers and directors of Continental Finance Corporation of
America, a holding company; that such holding company owned
all the stock of two existing Colorado banks and would hold all
the stock in the three new banks; and that the manager of each
new bank would have limited loan authority. The court in allow·
ing the charter to issue, noted that each proposed bank wa_s'
separate corporation; organized as an independent corporatton
entirely; each bank having its own independent capital structure:
and each with a separate and independent loan basis; factors
which the court held, indicated an independent banking operation. The court concluded then by holding:
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'That it is not enough to show common control

tk :.rngh common stock ownership and partici-

pation, but it must be shown that the alleged bank
is doing business with the alleged parent in the
same way as if the institutions were one; and, it
must be shown that, 'the unitary type of operation', which is the hallmark of branch banks is
present".
Federal Courts which have considered the question in the
context of adjudication under the National Banking Act ( 12 USC
Section 26) which makes state branch banking laws applicable
to national banks, have reached a similar result. First National
Bank of Billings vs. First Bank Stock Co., (CA 9th Cir 1962) 306
F2d 937; Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney (CA DC Cir 1961), 301
F2d 251.
In the First National Bank case, supra, the Circuit Court
held that it was not enough to show common ownership and control through stock ownership, and further that the fact that two
banks had common directors and that one bank allowed the
other to use its night deposit and vault facilities was not sufficient
to show a branch bank. The Court pointed out that the two
banks were separate corporations, each with its own capital, surplus and undivided profit, and its separate banking house.
As stated by the Court the critical question was whether
one bank was doing business through the instrumentality of the
other or vice versa, in the same way as if the institutions were
one.
The second Federal case having bearing on the question
is that of Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney, supra. This was a suit by
a New Jersey banking corporation to enjoin the Comptroller of
Currency from issuing a certificate of authority to permit a
national bank to establish a banking facility in Camden.
Under the facts of the case, nine directors of the Haddenfield National Bank filed an application for a new bank and
appellants objected before the Comptroller. The court upheld
rhe granting of the application even though directors and stockholders cf Haddenfield National would :ilso be directors and
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and stockholders of the new bank. The Court pointed out that
the capital structure of the two was completely independent, that
the new bank's stockholders would be liable for their shares in
the new bank independent of Hadden field and that the new bar,'.,
was located 2 miles from the office of Hadden field.
The court placed great emphasis on the fact that dc!Jmi:s
with the new bank would be its own liability and not Haddenfields and that its loan limits would be those applicable to an
independent bank, based on its own capital structure and totally
independent of loan limitations applicable to Haddenfield
National.
The cirtical factors which must be examined in dctermin
ing the existence of a branch bank as indicated by the cases
above was succinctly stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court
in a recent decision . .-1pplication of Kc11nel1l'ortl1 State Rank, 49
NJ 330, 230 A2d 377. 1967. 23 ALR 3rd 683. 686.
The facts of that case were very similar to these now before the court, in that an established bank appealed the granting
of a charter to another banking institution to locate in the community on the grounds that the new bank was in fact a branch
of the other institution and thereby prohibited from locating in
the community. The court affirmed the granting of the charter
notwithstanding the fact that a majority of the outstanding stock
of the new bank and the directorship would be in the hands of
the stockholders and directors of the other bank. In so holding,
the court distinguished a branch bank from other banking relationships in the following terms:
"A branch bank is not a separate corporation or
legal entity but is an office or agency operated by
the legal entity which operates the main bank. It
has no separate board of directors or capital
structure. its deposits arc pooled with those of
the main bank and its loan limits arc based on
the main bank's capital structure."
In applying the law as hereinabove sctforth to the facts
of this case, it is clear that the proposed bank docs not constitute
a branch of the Bank of Utah.
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The testimony at the hearing and the application itself
clearly indicates that the proposed bank will be a separate legal
entity ort,anized under the corporate laws of the State of Utah.
A3 testified by Mr. Beutler the proposed bank will have
" ocparate and distinct board of directors and although some of
rhe members of said board are also directors of the Bank of Utah
1Tr J 55) this has no bearing on the question of whether the proposed bank constitutes a branch bank. Peoples Bank vs. Banking Hoard, supra; Goldy vs. Crane, supra; First National Bank of
Hi/lings i•s. First Bank Stock Co.; (CA 9th Cir 1962) 306 F2d
937: Camden Trust Co. vs. Gidney, supra; Application of
Ke1111elworth State Bank, supra.

That this is a common practice in banking circles around
the nation and here in Utah is evidenced by the testimony of Mr.
Beutler, wherein he testified that the practice of interlocking
officers and directors is common in Utah (Tr. 111) and that
()ne Emerson Sturdevant is an officer or director of at least six
different banks in the State. (Tr. 109)
Mr. Beutler further testified that at least seven other
banks in the State had officers or directors which were also
ufficers or directors of at least one other bank. (Tr. 109-111)
The president of the proposed bank will be a person not
affiliated with the Bank of Utah in any way. Also, said bank
will have its own separate employees and location (Tr 94,147,
150). of even more significance is the fact that the proposed
bank will have its own separate loan base independent of any
other bank. With its o.vn deposit liability and loan limitations.
(Tr 61, et seq)
The stock ownership in the proposed bank will not be
entirely in the hands of any other bank; however, certain of the
present applicants do hold approximately 51% of the outstanding stock of the Bank of Utah (Tr. 157). However, the fact of
common stock ownership has no bearing on the question of
whether the proposed bank constitutes a branch bank. Peoples
Hank vs. Banking Board, supra; First National Bank of Billings
1•s. First Bank Stock Co., supra.
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That common stock ownership is a common practice lt,
banking circles was evidenced by the testimony of Dr. Nelson, an
officer of First Security Corporation, called as a witness for
plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank, who admitted that the First
Security Corporation owned the controlling stock in both l;"
First Security State Bank and First Security Bank (NA). (Tr 3%.
Protestant in its brief makes great issue out of the similarity of the name of the proposed bank and that of the Bank of
Utah. However, it conveniently ignores the same similarity between one of the protestants, First Security State Bank anrl
First Security Bank (NA).
It should be noted that protestant cities to no competent
authority for its assertions as to what constitutes branch bank
ing, but rests its arguments on secondary authorities and cam
dealing with matters completely outside the banking area. The ,
only case which has any relevancy at all is the case of Whitne_v
National Bank in Jefferson Parish vs. Bank of New Orleans arid
Trust Co. (CA DC Cir 1963) 323 F2d 290, reversed 379 US 411.
Which was decided under a Louisana Law which prohibited the
opening of new banks through holding companies and therefore.
is inapplicable in this case.
1

As clearly indicated by the law and facts as recited above. '
the proposed Bank of Northern Utah possesses all the attributes
of a unit bank. Such bank is an independent legal entity, with a
separate capital structure and with its own separate and distinct
loan base and deposit liability, operating at a separate and distinct
location.

POINT II
THE COMMISSIONER OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WAS NOT GUILTY OF PREJUDICIAL
ERROR IN REFUSING TO DISCLOSE OR IN
FAILING TO ALLOW DISCOVERY OF INFORMATION WHICH WAS IMMATERIAL AND IRRELEVANT.
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It is well recognized by the courts of this country and the
Stare of Utah, that alleged errors in proceedings before admintstrat_1ve bodies which do the complaining party no inurywill not
c;suty
the determination of such body. Utah Gas
\, :;•,cc Co. vs. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., (Utah) 422 P2d 530
:1967) 18 ALR 2d552SectionlO;U.S.vs.PierceAutoFreight
Lines, 66 S Ct 687, 327 US 515; 73 CJS, Public Administrative
Bodies and Procedures 210.
1

In the matter before the court, plaintiff alleges that the
Commissioner committed reversable error in not allowing them
to see the financial statements of the applicants and in refusing
to disclose a list of stockholders of the Bank of Utah and the
Bank of Ben Lomond.
Assuming without admitting that the plaintiff had a right
to such documents, the question remains, was the withholding
of such documents prejudicial to the plaintiffs so as to constitute
an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion on the part of
the Commissioner.
Section 7-1-26 UCA 1953 as amended, sets forth the circumstances in which the Commissioner may refuse to approve
an application for a unit bank in essentially the following terms:
1.
When the plan of operation does not comply with
the laws of Utah, or with accepted and prevailing
practices; or,

2.
When the incorporators or organizers shall not be of
such a character, responsibility and general fitness as to
warrant a belief that the business will be honestly conducted in accordance with law and for the best interests
of the members, customers and depositors of the institution; or,
3.
When the location or field of operation of the proposed business shall be in such close proximity to an
established business subject to the banking laws of the
State, that such established business might be unreasonably interfered with and the support of the new business
would be such as to make improbable its success; or,
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4.
When other good and sufficient reasons exist for '
such refusal.
Under the provisions of the above Statute the rnly jLt r?1ination
to b_e n:ade as to the applicants individually
m approving the application, ts whether the incorporators or
organizers are of such character, responsibility and general fit.
ness as to warrant the belief that the business will be conducted
in accordance with law and for the best interest of the members
customers and depositors of the institution. There is no require,
ment that any finding as to the financial status of the organizers
be made.
That ths was the intent of the legislature is evidenced by
the fact that Section 7-3-10 UCA 1953 as amended, specifically
provides that the proposed bank before commencing business
must have a certain amount of subscribed stock and a certain
expense fund. The critical points being that such financial requirements are to be met before commencing business and not
at the time of application, and that the Statute limits the
question of financial responsibility specifically to the bank as an
entity and not to the independent financial ability of its organizers and incorporators.
As to the question of the general fitness of the applicants
the record is more than adequate to support that finding. This
is evidenced by the background information sheets on the application submitted to the Commissioner and by the qualifications
of the applicants which were brought out during the course oi
the hearing. (Tr 57-60, 146, 253)
This fact was recognized by Judge Bryant H. Croft of the
District Court who after studying the complete record affirmed
the Commissioner's action and in so doing stated:
"(T)hat in this case no effort is made, and indeed none could be made, to content that the intended incorporators of the Bank of Northern
Utah are of such a character, responsibility and
general fitness as to warrant the belief that the
business would not be honestly conducted in
accordance with law and the best interest of the
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members, customers and depositors of the institution. Indeed, the one complaint made about
the incorporators is that most of them are established, experienced bankers in the Davis-Weber
County areas ............. " (R 29)
From the above it is evident that under the clear meaning
of the Statute no finding need be made on the particular financial status of the applicants. Even assuming without admitting
that it was error to withhold the financial statements; such
statements were irrelevant and immaterial in the determination
of this question in that substantial evidence found in the record
supports the finding that the applicants are of such a character, responsibility and general fitness as to warrant the belief that
said bank will be conducted honestly in accordance with law and
in the best interest of the members, customers, and depositors
of said bank.
The second allegation made by the appellants is that they
were prejudiced by the Commissioner's failure to disclose to
them a list of stockholders of the Bank of Utah and the Bank of
Ben Lomond, an argument which is frivolous for at least two
reasons.
In the first instance, it must be recognized that in fact
the plaintiffs were given information as to what interest the proposed incorporators held in both the Bank of Utah and the Bank
of Ben Lomond. In that regard, it was testified that the incorporators did not own the controlling interest in the Bank of Ben
Lomond, but that they did in the Bank of Utah. (Tr 156, 15 7,
159, 160) Further, plaintiffs had the opportunity to question the
individual incorporators as to their interest and were in fact, invited to do so. (Tr 158) However, they declined said invitation.
(Tr 159) At no point in the record did the plaintiff question the
incorporators as to their individual holdings in other banks although presented with the opportunity to do so. (Tr 57-112,
154, 146-152, 253-270)
Secondly, under the law as it exists in this country and
the State of Utah, the question of stock ownership in other
banking institutions has no bearing on the determination of
whether to approve an application for a unit bank.
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The courts have uniformily held that stock ownership 15
irrelevant as a test to determine the existence of a branch bank
Peoples Bank vs. Banking Board, supra; Goldy vs. Crane, supro:
Application of Kennelworth State Rank, supra; First National
Bank of Billings vs. First Bank Stock Co., supra; Ca1nde;i i.·•ii,
Co. vs. Gidney, supra.
Further, under Utah Law, the requirements for the establishment of a unit bank are established by Section 7-1-26 UCA
1953, as amended, which is essentially setforth in Point I. Under
this provision the question of stock ownership in another bank
has no bearing on the statutory requirements which must be met
to establish a unit bank. Nor, is there any law in the State of
Utah which makes illegal bank holding companies as such.
Therefore, for tre court, at this point, to make stock
ownership in other banks a criterion for the approving of applications for unit banks would amount to legislation on its part.
gard:

As stated by the New Jersey Supreme Court in this re" ..... (T)he legislature could have, but did not prohibit an individual from being a stockholder or a
director in more than one bank. Nor did it adopt
any inactment aimed specifically at chain banking resulting from such common stock holdings
and directorships. In view of the well recognized
distinction between chain and branch banking,
the legislature restrictions aimed specifically at
branch banking should not be extended by the
judiciary to banks which are independently structured and operated though affiliated. If the legislature wishes such extension it may adopt suitable
enactmento .......... "
Application of Kennelworth State Bank, supra.

From the foregoing it is obvious that in fact the plaintiff '
was supplied with information as to the stock ownership of the
applicants in the Bank of Utah and the Bank of Ben Lomo_nd.
However, even assuming such information had not been supplied
to the plaintiffs it would not constitute prejudicial error in t_hat
such information was irrelevant and immaterial to the questwn 1
then before the Commissioner.
'
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POINT HI
THE REQUIREDCAPITALAND SURPLUS OF
THE PROPOSED BANK NEED NOT BE PAID
IN UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CERTIFICATE
OF INCORPORATION IS ISSUED.
Section 7-3-10 UCA 1953, as amended, sets forth the
minimum subscribed capital which a bank must have in order to
commence business.
The point at which a proposed bank must establish that

it has such required capital is established by Section 7-3-11
UCA, 1953, as amended, which provides as follows:

"The Secretary of State shall not issue a certificate of incorporation to any bank authorizing it
to do business in this State until it shall appear to
him by the affidavit of at least three of the incorporators that the proposed corporation has the
requisite amount of capital stock subscribed and
also the required surplus and that at least fifty
per cent of the capital stock and surplus of the
corporation has been paid in cash."
Therefore, it is clear that the statutory requirements as to
the capital and surplus must be met at the time the certificate of
incorporation is to be issued and not when the application for
its approval is filed with the Commissioner.

POINT IV
THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN THIS MATTER
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD AND HIS EXERCISE
OF DISCRETION IN REGARDS THERETO
WAS NOT ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS.
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Section 7-1-26 UCA 1953, as amended, provides that
the reviewing court
reverse the_ decision of the Banking
Comm1ss1oner only m mstances where It fmds that such decisions
are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law.
in _order for _the court to upset the ruling cif
the Comm1ss10n m this matter, It must find that such decision ii
not supported by substantial evidence taken from the record as
a whole, or that it is arbitrary or capricious. Zions First National
Bank (NA) vs. Taylor 15 U2d 239, 390 P2d 854 (1964 ). 1\1cNiRht
vs. State Land Board 14 U2d 238, 381 P2d 726 ( 1963).

1

In holding that an administrative agency has acted arbitrary or capricious the courts seem to require unreasoning action
by the agency in disregard of facts and circumstances. However.
when there is room fer two opinions, action is not arbitrary or
capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration
even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion hJ1
been reached. State ex rel Cosmopolis vs, Bruno, 61Wash2d 461.
379 P2d 691; Petition of the City of Bellevue 62 Wash 2d 458.
383 P2d 286. Further, the court may not substitute its judgment in discretionary matters for that of the administrative
agency. Zions First National Bank (NA) vs. Taylor, supra.
The inquiry as to whether substantial evidence appears
from the record to substantiate the administrative agencies factual findings, is limited to the question of whether there exists.
in the record such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept such as adequate to support a conclusion. America11
Foundry and Machine Co. vs. Utah Labor Relations Board,(Utah)
141 P2d 390 (1943); Howard vs. Lindmier, (Wyo), 214 P2d 737.
At the outset it should be noted that administrative
agencies are not bound by the technical rules of evidence applicable to a court of law and in fact may and should admit hearsay
evidence if it is relevant and of such a character, and or quality
as that on which responsible persons are accusr,,med to rely in
conduct of serious affairs. Richard Mast vs. State Board of
Optometry; (Cal), 193 P2d 148 (1956). That this is the law in '
Utah is evidenced by the decision of this court in the case of
Lakeshore Motor Coach Lines, Inc. vs. Welling, 9 U2d 114, 339
P2d 1011 (1959) wherein the court indicated that fact findings
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b;ised to some extent on hearsay evidence were not invalid if
ch findings were also supported by a residuum of competent

q 1

c·v1Jcncc.

h.

(.<

In the matter here before the court, each finding made
C:olllmissioner is supported by competent evidence in the

1ccord.

Mr. Charles Cuneo, the Superintendent of the DelMonte
Distribution Center at the Freeport Center, and President of the
Clearfield Chamber of Commerce (Tr 22) testified that in his
opinion another bank was needed in Clearfield (Tr 32). Said
opinion being based on knowledge acquired by Mr. Cuneo
rhrough his activities as President of the Clearfield Chamber of
Commerce and Superintendent of the DelMonte Distribution
Center: and from official records submitted to him in his official
capacity as President of the Chamber of Commerce (Tr 24 ).
The argument that Mr. Cuneo's testimony is rank hearand not entitled to any probative value is succinctly put to
rest in the Lakesl1ore case, supra., wherein this court in ruling
that the opinion of an applicant as to the need for carrier service was sufficient to support a finding stated:

,;1v

"(T)hat a moments reflection makes plain that
a very high proportion of the knowledge of mankind is acquired through sharing of experiences
of others and from sources which, in one sense,
might be considered as hearsay. We do not and
could not, experience everything first hand, but
we do obtain much credible evidence and knowledge from many sources other than experiencing
the primary facts themselves." (9 U2d 114, 339
P2dl011)
Added testimony of the need for another bank in Clearfield was given by the Mayor of Clearfield City who testified as
to the growth of the community as evidenced by new business
!Tr 41), increased activity at Hill Air Force Base (Tr 40), and
increased population over the past years. (Tr 43)
The need and feasibility of another bank in Clearfield
City was further substantiated by the study prepared by Dr.
Milton Matthews, an expert in the field of Marketing, (EX 1) and
-1 5-

one experienced in projecting the need and probable succc 51 ,,f •
business based on population and other
data.
Dr. Matthews ciualification a11d '"f)cricnce in this fitld
is unquestionable and in fact. he has, in the past, prepared oi ... :: ..
studies of the C:learfield and Davis County areas for one of tk
protestanb here. 1-ie
acted as consultant to many orhc·
banks and financial institutions (Tr 11 5, 117; Ex 1 per:-onal ,
qualifications).
Based on the evidence presented at the hearing it was
established that Davis County and the Clearfield area is one of
the fastest growing areas in the State. (Tr 118, 407, 408)
Evidence established the approximate population of
Davis County in excess of 95,000, with approximately 50,000
people residing in the Clearfield and the North Davis County
area (Tr 128 Ex 1, p 16). The City of Clearfield itself having a
population of in excess of 10,000 people. (Tr 129)

Dr. Matthews further testified to the fact that the trading
area of the proposed Bank of Northern Utah and the appellant,
Clearfield State Bank would not be limited to Clearfield City
itself, but would also include the surrounding communities of
Syracuse, West Point, Sunset and Clinton. (Tr 129) This fact was
substantiated by the testimony of Mr. Steed, an officer of the
plaintiff, when he testified that a good portion of the trade of
appellant, Clearfield State Bank, came from outside Clearfield
City. (Tr 331)
The trading area which is served by the appellant, Clear·
field State Bank and which would be served by the defendant,
Bank of Northern Utah has a population of approximately
15 ,000 people (Tr 129). A fact which makes the average popula·
tion per banking facility in this area double what it is for Davis
County as a whole and almost two and half times greater than
the average for the entire state. (Tr. 132)
Further justification for the granting of the application
here in question is evidenced by the fact that the median family
income in Davis County and the Clearfield area is among the
highest in the State (Ex 1, pps 67, 68, 69) andaswouldbecx·
pected the number of families having incomes less than $3,000.
00, among the lowest (Tr 140).
-16-

The growth and prosperity of the area was further
pointed up by the above average valuation of the owner occupied
huusing in the area (Ex 1, p 40) and the substantial growth with
tfie banks in the North Davis area, including the plaintiff, have
c:-:pcri•·nccd over the past ten years. (Ex 1, p 50)
Dr. Matthews testified that based on his study, it was
hi:. opinion that another bank was needed in Clearfield and that
in fact he had first recognized this need ten years before while
doing a previous study of the area. (Tr 164)
In regards to the projected profitability of the proposed
Bank of Northern Utah, defendant, called as its witness Mr.
William W. Beutler, an individual of extensive experience in the
banking field, who had testified before the Commissioner on
previous occasions (Tr 61 ). Mr. Beutler testified that the propmed bank could operate profitably in Clearfield City (Tr 61 et
>eq.). basing said projection on what he, as an experienced
banker would estimate the cost to be in running such a bank
Jnd on the expected volume of business as projected from the
growth trends setforth in Dr. Matthews' study. (Tr 65, Ex 1,
p 50)

It is evident from the record that in terms of population
and the general characteristics of the Clearfield area in regards to
employment, income and growth potential that another bank is
needed in Clearfield City.
The plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank relied heavily on
two points in support of their argument of the lack of any need
for another bank in Clearfield. The first being the high percentage of persons under 18 years of age in Davis County and
second, the low per capita sales tax collected in the area. (Tr
384, Tr 377)
As to the former, plaintiff would have us believe that
the fact that there are more_ persons under 1? years of age in
Davis County indicates less of a need for a banking facility. On
closer observation it becomes clear that such a statistic is only
more evidence of what Dr. Matthews established; namely, that
said area is growing, that young families are moving in, and with
them bring more demand for the money and services which a
bank is equipped to supply. As to the question oflow per capita
sales tax collection in the area, this factor is nothing more than
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an indication that facilities are lacking in the area, and that whe:
facd1t1es arc not available people will go elsewhere to find th
A fact whi.ch. was recognized by Dr. Nelson, called as a
by the plamt1ff. (Tr 404) In this regard he further testified th,
1
in fact the banks in Davis County did not have sufficient 1 d:
capacity to meet the needs of the residents and that
being forced to go to Ogden and Salt Lake to meet these need.
(Tr419)
Under the above analysis, it is clear that there is in tht
record substnatial evidence to support the finding of the Com
missioner of Financial Institutions in this matter and the fact'
that. he chose to give more weight to evidence presented by the ,
applicant than to that presented by the plaintiff is a matter w1th
in his discretion and does not constitute a basis for this court to
disturb his decision.

POINT V
THE PROPOSED LOCATION OF THE DEFENDANT APPLICANT IS NOT IN SUCH
CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE CLEARFIELD
STATE BANK AS TO MAKE IMPROBABLE
THE SUCCESS OF EITHER.
Section 76-1-26, UCA 1953, as amended, provides in pan
that the Commissioner of Financial Institutions may deny an
application when the location or field of operation of the pro
posed business shall be in such close proximity to an established '
business subject to this title that such established business might ,
be unreasonably interfered with and the support of the nrn
business would be such as to make improbable its success.
The extent of the Commissioner's discretion in making
such a determination was succinctly setforth by this court in the '
case of Zions First National Bank vs. Taylor, 15 U2d 239, 390 ,
P2d 854. In that case the court in discussing the "close pron
mity" question in connection with branch banks noted that
"close proximity" in and of itself was not determinative of the
question and stated that:
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"l t is the duty and prerogative of the Bank Com-

missioner to determine whether a branch bank
shall be granted or denied. He must
ci.:cide if the establishment of a new branch would
uw, asonable interfere with the business of an
Lxisting bank or branch. The courts will not over
ruk his de_cision, if it is supported by any substantial evidence and is not arbitrary or capricious." 15 U2d 239, 240
:1 p plication

It is clear from the record that the proposed bank will
be located on the Smith Plaza in Clearfield (Ex 1, p 13). Mr.
Smith. one of the incorporators and president of the company
which owns the plaza testified to the fact that he had been
approached to construct the bank there and that they were prepared to enter into a lease agreement upon the granting of the
charter. (Tr 147)
That the plaintiff had no question as to where the new
bank would be located is evidenced by the fact that after application was filed by the defendant, Bank of Northern Utah for
,1pproval. plaintiff purchased land just down the street from
,aid proposed construction site, (Tr 34 5) and then introduced
testimony that they intended to build a new banking house
rhcrc at some future date (Tr 29 5-296)
The facts before the CiJmmissioner were clear as to the
loL.ition of the new bank. This location being approximately
011c-half mile fran the offices of the plaintiff, Clearfield State
Bank. ITr 145)
The record indicates that plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank
the only bank located within Clearfield City, having been established in 1917 (Tr 277) and that between 19 58 and 1968 its
total assets increased from $4,878,489.00 to $9,210,266.00
i Ex 1, p 50); that First Security Bank of Utah has assets of over
one-half of one billion dollars and has a branch office serving the
Hill Field area; that State Savings and Loan Association, which
does not conduct a full banking business has assets of over
93.000,000.00; that other protestant banks with locations more
than 3 miles from the proposed site have likewise almost doubled
their assets over a ten year period (Ex 1, p50); and that Clearfiel<l City with a population of over 10,000 (Tr 129), excluding

1s
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military personnel on Hill Air Force Base (Tr 327,355) has one
bank, while Layton with a population of 14,289 has three banb
(Ex 1, p 13)
.
Substantial evidence, some of which is set out above
supports the conclusion of the Banking
thr Ji,
establishment of the defendant,Bank of Northern Utah, in Clear.
field would not unreasonably interfere with the business of
plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank, and that support for the new
bank was not so lacking as to make improbable its success.
At this point it should be noted that because of the
different nature of branch banking the law specifically requires
that in order to establish a branch bank one must show that
"public convenience" and "advantage" will be promoted by the
establishment of the branch. (7-3-6 UCA 1953 as amended).
However, the law requires no such showing when the question is
one of establishing a unit bank. (7-1-26 UCA 1953 as amended).
Even assuming that such a showing must be made in the
case of unit banks, the record is adequate to support such a find·
ing. Mr. Steed, an officer of the plaintiff, Clearfield State Bank
testified as to the poor and inconvenient location of their banking office (Tr 297) while at the same time the record shows that
the office of defendant, Bank of Northern Utah will be constructed in a shopping center convenient to all those who wish to avall
themselves of its services. (Ex 1, p 13, Tr. 14 7)

CONCLUSION

The Commissioner of Financial Institutions, as in the
case of other administrative agencies, is given wide discretion in
carrying out his administrative duties. His exercise of this dis·
cretion may not be disturbed by this court unless found to be
arbitrary, capricious or not supported by any substantial evid
ence in the record. Nor, may this court substitute its judgment
for that of the Commissioner in discretionary matters.
At the hearing, consi<lerable evidence was introduced by
both parties. The Commissioner allowing in and making available
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ro th-c parties all evidence which was material and relevant to the

qt1c,t1on there under consideration.

Under the law as cited in Point I above, and the evidence
,,;1tJincd in the record, it is clear that the proposed Bank of
"Jorthern Utah constitutes a unit bank. It is a separate legal
entity with a separate capital structure and with its own separate
3 nd distinct board of directors, loan base and deposit liability.
Substantial evidence in the record pointed up the need
and feasibility of the establishment of another unit bank in Clearfield City. Relying on that evidence, the Commissioner approved
the application of the defendant, Bank of Northern Utah to establish its offices within that City.
From the record it cannot be said that the decision of the
Commissioner of Financial Institutions, in granting the application, was unsupported by any substantial evidence in the record or that his action was arbitrary or capricious. For this
rea;on, this Court should affirm the decision of the district court
upholding the Commissioner's action in granting the application
of defendant, Bank of Northern Utah to establish a unit bank in
Clearfield City.
Respectfully submitted,

J.
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